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A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF
UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITY IN THE
CONGO AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA
Agola Auma-Osolo*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations was created as an international instrument
for world peace and security, as evidenced in article I, paragraphs
1-4 of the United Nations Charter. Attempts to execute these duties, however, have been disparaged by some of its own Member
States' and criticized by authors who contend that the United
*Instructor, African Studies and Political Science; Ph.D. candidate
SUNY/Buffalo. B.A., 1968, University of North Carolina; MACIA (Master of Arts
with Certificate in International Affairs), 1969, University of North Carolina;
HCIL (The Hague Certificate in International Law), 1969, The Hague.
My gratitude to Professors Keener C. Frazer, Shepard Jones, C.B. Robinson,
Donald Shea, Bruce Fetter, Carol Baumann, and Mr. Dennis Firztatrsk for their
valuable criticisms on the previous drafts of this paper.
1. One major criticism by some Member States is that the United Nations is
by-passing its jurisdiction in repudiation of International Law under the Charter.
For a discussion of (a) the Netherlands position in the United Nations concerning
the Indonesian Question (1947); (b) the Iranian position in the International
Court of Justice concerning the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Question (1951); (c) the
French arguments in the United Nations concerning the Algerian Question
(1955); and (d) the positions of the United Kingdom, France and Israel in the
United Nations on the Suez Canal Question (1956) see AUMA-OSOLO, THE LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AS APPLIED TO INTERVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTIcLE 2(7) OF THE U.N. CHARTER, A Co i1ARATIvE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASES 35125 (1969) (an unpublished thesis, Univ. North Carolina). See also CASES ON
UNITED NATIONS LAW (L. Sohn ed. 1956); M. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DorEsTIC
JURISDICTION (1958). Some Member States allege that the United Nations is not,

under international law, doing enough with respect to what it was created to do.
For example, on Dec. 12,1960, former Indian Prime Minister Nehru protested the
arrest of the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, by KasavubuTshombe's forces. Disappointed by United Nations action in the Congo, Prime
Minister Nehru demanded the immediate release of Lumumba and vehemently
charged that the United Nations Force was too passive with respect to Katanga.
4 W.

JOSHUA, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN THE CONGO

1960-1964 20 (1966).

Also, the Afro-Asian and Warsaw Pact blocs were disappointed when their pro-
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Nations is either exceeding its jurisdiction or not exercising it when
necessary. Consequently, doubts have been raised about the legality of the United Nations intervention in the Congo Crisis of 1960.2
For instance, E.M. Miller3 contends that despite a series of resolu-tions passed by the Security Council concerning the situation in
the Congo (now Zaire), "neither. .. [the first] resolution nor any
subsequent resolutions . . . expressly provided for a United Nations Force;" and that none of these resolutions authorized "the
Secretary-General in explicit terms to establish a force." ' 4 Miller
further contends that the manner in which the United Nations
Force in the Congo was established represents a departure fr-om
previous methods employed, especially in Korea.'
A similar argument, with different dimensions, has been raised
by D.S. Wijewardane, who contends that the United Nations Force
in the Congo, though essentially peace-keeping, did not resemble
the "enforcement" forces originally contemplated in chapter VII of
the Charter. Both arguments intimate that the establishment and
dispatch of the United Nations Forces to the Congo lacked legal
provision under the Charter.
However, if the United Nations Force in the Congo was designed
to "perform a number of tasks throughout a vast territory [the
Congo] in order to fulfill its mandate. . . to prevent foreign intervention in the form of men, arms or military supplies, and to
prevent civil war"7 (emphasis added), then one wonders why
Miller and Wijewardane allege that the nature of the United Nations Force in the Congo lacked a genuine legal provision under
chapter VII of the Charter.
Further, there arises the question why the United Nations Force
in the Congo was finally used under Secretary-General U Thant's
posal that Belgium be charged with aggression against the Congo was vetoed by
the Security Council.
2. See, e.g., Miller, Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo,
55 AM. J. INT'L L. 10 (1961) [hereinafter cited as MILLER].
3. MILLER at 10.
4. MILLER at 10.
5. MILLER at 10.
6. Wijewardane, CriminalJurisdictionover Visiting Forces with Special Reference to InternationalSources, 41 BRrr. Y.B. I'L L. 122, 178 (1965-1966).
7. Seyersted, United Nations Forces, Some Legal Problems 37 Bmr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 351, 396-97 (1961).
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direction against the seceding Katanga (renamed Shaba) Province
while such action had been ruled out previously by his predecessor,
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. Although both Hammarskjold and the Congo Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, had
agreed in late July 1960 that the United Nations was "prepared to
maintain the United Nations Force in the Congo until such time
8
as it deems the latter's task to have been fully accomplished,"
when the Prime Minister requested that the Force be used against
Katanga's secession to eliminate the primary source of civil disorder, Secretary-General Hammarskjold refused to allow United
Nations Forces to enter Katanga on the ground that such action
would constitute a violation of Katanga's right of Domestic Jurisdiction under the Charter. As a result, the Congo problem reached
such enormous proportions that the two leaders became victims of
it-Lumumba was seized and ruthlessly murdered by supporters
of the seceding Katanga Province on January 17, 1961, and Hammarskjold died in a plane crash in Ndola (Northern Zimbabwe) on
September 17, 1961, while seeking a resolution to the problem. Not
until U Thant succeeded Hammarskjold as the United Nations
Secretary-General was the policy of the United Nations Force in
the Congo toward Katanga altered and the Force was authorized
to enter Katanga. Lumumba's appeal to the United Nations for
military assistance was not realistically fulfilled until December 5,
1961 (eighteen months later). By that time, the lives of both Hammarskjold and Lumumba as well as other individuals in the Congo
had been wasted simply because of United Nations inaction.
Thus, the history of the Congo Crisis of 1960 raises two pervasive
and crucial questions, the answers to which may have a determinative effect upon the destiny of African nations. First, to what extent is the United Nations ready to come to Africa's rescue in case
Africa is in danger of foreign aggression? Secondly, what precautionary measures must the African states take instead of relying
completely on the United Nations?
II.

PRELUDE TO THE CONGO CRISIS OF

1960

For 85 years, the Belgian colonial rule in the Congo perpetuated
slavery and abuse of the Congolese people' in repudiation of arti8. U.N. Doc. S/4389/Add. 5 (1960).
9. See R. CASEMENT, THE BLACK DIARES

OF ROGER CASEMENT

(1904); L. CLARK,
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cles VI and IX of the Berlin General Act of 1885.10 Thus, Belgian
acts in the Congo, which in turn drove the Congolese to extreme
anti-Europeanism, constituted a direct violation of the Berlin General Act and, thus, of international law.
Because of this hostility to Europeans, Patrice Lumumba, representing an extreme anti-Belgian viewpoint, became the spokesman
of the 126 Congolese delegates at the 1960 Brussels Conference,
received 80 per cent of the Stanleyville vote in the December 1959
election, won a majority in the National Chamber in the May 1960
elections, and received a 95 per cent vote of confidence from the
Congolese Senate in September 1960 against Kasavubu's attempt
to dismiss Lumumba from the Premiership. However, since this
extreme anti-Europeanism did not occur in the British and French
African colonies upon their independence, it is submitted that the
Congolese anti-Europeanism-in the Congo alone-must have
been generated by Belgium's unduly negligent and inhumane
behavior in the Congo.
After nearly a century of Belgian colonial rule most national
leaders, especially Patrice Lumumba-the most eloquent, prophetic, and erratic African politician' 1-emphatically demanded
Congolese independence. Consequently, the Belgian Government
called for the Round Table Conference with the Congolese nationalists, headed by Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Kasavubu, and Moise
Tshombe, in Brussels in January 1960.
During the Conference both parties assured each other, in good
faith, of their respect for the fundamental principles of human
rights, and their desire for the independence and territorial integrity of the Congolese people.12 Lumumba assured the Belgian delegation:
THROUGH AFRICAN EYES 42-63 (1970); R. DAVIS, THE CONGO AND COASTS OF AFRICA

(1970).
Berlin General Act of 1885. See R. BUELL, THE NATIVE PROBLEM IN AFRICA
CASEMENT, supra note 9.
11. The Times (London), Feb. 4, 1961. See also RoYAL ANTHROPOLIGICAL INSTITUTE, CONGO TRIBES AND PARTIES 44-45 (1961); L. TONDEL, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS IN THE CONGO 10 (1963).
12. La Crise Congolese, 13 CHRONIQUE DE POLmQUE ETRONGERE No. 406 (Institute Royal des Relations Internationales, Bruxelles, 1960) 630-31, 635-37, English
translationin A. MERRIAM, CONGO, BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT 352-54 (1961). See
also TONDEL, supra note 11, at 10.
10.

891-907 (1928);
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The fact that Belgium has liberated the Congo from the colonial
regime we were no longer prepared to accept, has won her the friendship and esteem of the Congolese peope. We desire this friendship
to be enduring and free of all forms of hypocrisy. We shall thus prove
to the world that the principle of friendship between nations is one
of real significance . . As for the Europeans living in the Congo
we should ask them to stay and help the young Congolese
State. .

.

. We need their help .

. .

. It is with their collaboration

that we wish to create the Congolese nation, in which all will find
their share of happiness and satisfaction."3
After the Brussels Round Table Conference, the Congo finally
was restored to self-rule on June 30, 1960. The new government was
headed by Joseph Kasavubu (President) and Patrice Lumumba
(Prime Minister). Below were the Provincial Premiers, such as
Moise Tshombe as Premier of the Katanga Province-the same
Tshombe who had grown rich through his dealings with the Belgians during the colonial period as a strong pro-Belgian.14 Thus, the
Congolese leadership held political views covering the entire spectrum from Lumumba's uncompromising anticolonialism to
Tshombe's pro-Belgian sentiments. 5
With these discrepancies among Congolese leadership, the new
government fell into a series of civil wars and disorders immediately after the Declaration of Independence. Both civilian government employees and the Army demanded more employment, Africanization of officers and noncommissioned officers, and expulsion
of all Belgians holding key Army posts. " To achieve this goal, they
13. The Round Table Conference, Brussels, Belgium, Jan. 1968. See Colin
Legum, The Life and Death of PatriceLumumba in P. LuwmnA, CONGO, MY
CoUNTRY xiii (1962).
14. J. STOESSINGER, THE MIGHT OF NATIONS: WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME 13738 (1961). According to Professor Stoessinger, there is no doubt that Tshombe was
a Belgian puppet. This is evidenced by the substantial amount of money
Tshombe received from the Belgians in exchange for protecting Belgian property
in Katanga Province. Id. at 127-28.
15. Id. at 138.
16. There were approximately 25,000 Congolese in the National Army but
none of them held any respectable office. On the whole, this was the error of the
Belgian Government that had failed to train and therefore prepare the Congolese
for their independence. As a result, it was questionable what the common Congolese could expect from independence. For instance, one Congolese asked: "Does
independence come wrapped in paper or do we get it at the bank?" See id. 137.
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mutinied and attacked or threatened Belgians and other Europeans in the area; the country was in chaos, with most Europeans in
an unspeakable panic. Tshombe exacerbated the deterioration of
order by declaring on July 11, 1960, that his Katanga Province had
seceded from the Congo Central Government to form a new and
separate state in alliance with Belgium. 7 With belief in African
Unity, which he preached on the grounds that "divisions lead to
the suicide of Africa,"'" Lumumba viewed Tshombe as a threat to
African freedom. As a result, the Congo Central Government immediately announced its intention of using force against the seceding Katanga Province.
Collaborating with Tshombe, Belgium intervened with her
troops under the claim that intervention in the Congo was necessary to protect the lives and property of the Belgian settlers in
Katanga. The Congo Central Government strongly denounced the
return of the Belgian armed forces as aggression, and called on the
United Nations for military assistance." Suspicious of United NaAlso, this same feeling was reported to the United Nations General Assembly on
Feb. 2, 1962 by Adoula, the new Prime Minister. Accusing Belgian colonial rule,
Prime Minister Adoula stated: "After 85 years of the Belgian presence, the Congo
had only a few university graduates and very few technicians and qualified officials." See 9 U.N. Rav. 19 (March 1962); TONDEL, supra note 11, at 2.
Secondly, it should be borne in mind that Lumumba was strictly determined
to adhere to the Brussels Round Table Agreements of January 1960 by maintaining the high-ranking Belgian military officers in their positions, although he accepted the demands of the Congolese troops for promotions and pay increases.
But, as the Belgian commanding officers in the Congolese Army abused and
refused to accept the Belgian Government grant of independence to the Congo,
the African troops mutinied and demanded that Lumumba expel all Belgians.
Lumumba tried to resist, but as the situation deteriorated, he finally gave in. On
July 8, he agreed to dismiss them all. On July 10, he appointed fornmer Sergeant
Victor Lundula to General of the Army and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff.
17. Most Belgian settlers fled into Kenya from the Congo. These refugees were
helped into Kenya by the East African Railways and Harbours enroute to Brussels. On their arrival at the Nairobi Railway Station, they were helped with
various supplies pending their deportation to Belgium. For further details see C.
LEGUM, CONGO DISASTER (1961). In his book, Legum estimates that "20 Europeans
in all were killed during this uproar, but the raping of women and mistreatment
of men were far more frequent as a concert of humiliations of the Aggressor." Id.
113.
18. A. ZOLBERG, CREATING POLrCAL ORDER: THE PARTY-STATES OF WEST
AFRICA 50 (1966).
19. U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960).
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tions inaction, Lumumba requested military aid from the United

States but President Eisenhower replied that any help to the
Congo had to come from the United Nations and not through unilateral United States intervention.2 1 Consequently, Lumumba
turned once again to the United Nations for help.
III.

UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONGO

Under chapter IV, art. 35, para. 2 of the United Nations Charter,
"A state which is not a member of the United Nations may bring
to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly any
dispute to which it is a party. .

.

."

In conformity with this provi-

sion, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, in the
name of the Congo Central Government, brought to the attention
of the United Nations the existing situation in the Congo on July
12, 1960, and pleaded with the Secretary-General for immediate
assistance against Belgian aggression. In their cable, the two Congolese leaders stated:
The Government of the Republic of the Congo requests urgent
dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request
is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian
troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on June 29, 1960. Under the
terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request of the Congolese Government. No such request was
ever made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo and we
therefore regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our country.
The real cause of most disturbances can be found in colonialist

machinations. We accuse the Belgian Government of having care.fully prepared the secession of Katanga with a view to maintaining
a hold on our country. The Government, supported by the Congolese
people, refuses to accept a fait accompli resulting from a conspiracy
between Belgian imperialists and a small group of Katanga leaders.

The overwhelming majority of the Katanga population is opposed
20. Most African nationalists were very skeptical about the reply. They, in
fact, took it as "kitchen-diplomacy" business, since Belgium and the United
States are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They also
expected something constructive and more active from the United States than
from any other country. Therefore, Eisenhower's reply was a great shock to most
of them.
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to secession, which means the disguised perpetuation of the colonialist regime. The essential purpose of the requested military aid is
to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present
external aggression which is a threat to international peace. We
strongly stress the extremely urgent need for the dispatch of United
Nations troops to the Congo. 2'

The United Nations reacted slowly at first. The Soviet Union's
suggestion to condemn the "armed aggression" by Belgium was
vetoed by the Western Powers in the Security Council. Unofficially, Belgium was asked by the United Nations Security Council
to withdraw its troops from the Congo, 2 but the Belgian Government would neither comply with this request nor accept mediation;n instead, Belgium insisted that its troops were to stay in the
Congo indefinitely. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba then jointly dispatched another cable to the SecretaryGeneral reiterating the need for military aid. 24 Like the first cable,
this cable strongly emphasized that military aid was not needed
against internal but against external aggression. In addition, it
stated that unless the United Nations responded immediately, the
Congolese Government would be forced to seek other assistance,
especially from the Bandung Treaty Powers.H
However, on July 14, 1960, the Security Council unanimously
adopted" a resolution2 authorizing the dispatch of military aid to
21. U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960). See also 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1A, U.N. Doc.
A/4390/Add. 1 (1960).
22. U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960).
23. Dr. Ralph Bunche (a United States national and United Nations Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs) had been in the Congo since Independence.
He spent the whole of July 12 mediating in the Congo-Belgian troop clashes in
vain.
24. U.N. Doc. S/4382, at 2 (1960).
25. According to the STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 86m CONG.,
2D SESS.,

STAFF MEMORANDUM ON THE REPUBLIc OF THE CONGO

11 (1960) Prime

Minister Lumumba cabled Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev informing him
that "we may have to ask the Soviet Union's intervention should the Western
camp not stop its aggression." In this same document, it is also reported that
Khrushchev replied that his country "will not shrink from resolute measures to
curb aggression." See also I. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 228 (1967).
26. Voting for the resolution were Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Italy, Poland,
Tunisia, the United States, and the Soviet Union. See also CATHERINE HosKYNS,
THE CONGO SINCE INDEPENDENCE, 484-86 (1965).

27. The adopted resolution read as follows: The Security Council,
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the Congo and formally calling upon Belgium to remove its troops
from the Congo. Nationalist China, France and Britain abstained,2 upon the failure of the French attempt to veto United
Nations intervention by resorting to article 2, paragraph 7 of the
United Nations Charter, which prohibits United Nations intervention in a State's domestic jurisdiction.
On the following day (July 15), before the United Nations Force
had been dispatched to the Congo, Lumumba, in repudiation of a
sixteen-day old Treaty of Friendship with Belgium, declared, a
state of war with Belgium. On July 18, Hammarskjold reported to
the Security Council that the United Nations Force of 3,500
troops 29 had arrived in the Congo and that more would be sent
soon." One day later, Belgium accepted a truce and agreed to
remove its forces from "Leopoldville" to their original bases within
four days.3 1
IV.
A.

A

CRITIQUE

Applicability of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter

Was it illegal under the domestic jurisdiction provision, article
2(7) of the Charter, for the United Nations to intervene in the
Congo? Was it essentially an internal problem of the Congolese
Considering the report of the Secretary-General on a request for the United
Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,
Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the SecretaryGeneral by the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (Document S/4382),
1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the
territory of the Republic of the Congo;
2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the
Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through
the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the
United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the
Government, to meet fully their tasks:
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate." U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
28. Id.
29. Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Tunisia.
30. U.N. Doc. S/4389 (1960).
31. U.N. Doc. S/4389/Add. 1 (1960).
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Government? Was it a unilateral action of the United Nations to
intervene in the Congo or was it through the invitation of a legitimate government? These are the fundamental questions that
should be examined to understand fully the legality of the United
Nations action in the Congo.
According to article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present United Nations Charter; but this principleshall not prejudicethe application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." (Emphasis added.)
In view of this provision, should we still insist that the United
Nations violated its obligation by intervening in the Congolese
domestic jurisdiction? It is submitted that this question should be
answered in the negative.
Despite the presence of article 2(7), in his opening statement to
the Security Council, Secretary-General Hammarskjold emphasized that his request for an immediate meeting of the Security
Council was made under article 99 of the United Nations Charter, 2
which empowers "[tihe Secretary-General [to] bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." Thus, when Belgium refused to honor two previous Security
Council resolutions-U.N. Doc. S/4387 and U.N. Doc. S/4405, respectively-in repudiation of its obligation under articles 25 and
49 of the United Nations Charter, which require all Member States
to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council, Hammarskjold found it necessary to press the Security Council for a
third resolution against Belgium. 3 Consequently, on August 9,
1960, the third resolution (S/4426) was adopted; it called upon all
Member States to accept and carry out the measures decided by
the Security Council in respect to the Congo and in accordance
with the United Nations Charter. 3 Since it was incumbent on
Belgium to honor the first two resolutions of the Security Council,
32. 15 U.N. SCOR 873rd meeting 7 (1960). See also MILLER, supra note 2, at
2; TONDEL, supra note 11, at 14.
33. U.N. Doc. S/4426 (1960).
34. Id.
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the question arises why it was necessary to pass a third resolution.
To explain the necessity of the third resolution, the SecretaryGeneral emphasized that whereas the first and second resolutions
had made no explicit reference to the Charter provisions upon
which the Security Council was acting, the third resolution called
to the attention of the Katanga provincial authorities articles 35
and 49 of the Charter, which provide, respectiv'ely, that both Members and non-Members must bring their disputes to theUnited
Nations and that Members must join in mutual assistance to carry
out Security Council measures., 5 Hammarskjold emphasized:
The [first and second] resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and
22 July were not explicitly passed under Chapter VII [of the
Charter], but they were passed on the basis of an initiative under
Article 99. For that reason, I have felt entitled to quote three Articles
under Chapter VII, and I repeat what I have already said in this
respect: in a perspective which may well be short rather than long,
the problem facing the Congo is one of peace or war-and not only
in the Congo.3"
Although the Secretary-General did not refer to article 39, which
authorizes the Security Council to determine the existence of any
act of aggression, it is evident that there was a more immediate
demand for the use of chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
than that of article 39 per se.37
B.

Legal PrinciplesAuthorizing the United NationsForces in the
Congo

To ascertain whether the actions of the United Nations Force in
the Congo were consistent with the United Nations Charter, it is
necessary to compare article 2(7) with United Nations action pursuant to articles 41 and 42 as well as the resolutions of the Security
Council and the General Assembly. Provisional measures under
35. U.N. Doc. S/4417, at 5 (1960). Both Members and non-Members of the
United Nations can bring their disputes to the United Nations (art. 35). Member
States must join in mutual assistance to carry out the Security Council's mea-

sures (art. 41).
36. 15 U.N. SCOR, 884th meeting 5 (1960).
37. See 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTrCE OF U.N. ORGANs 338-41 (1955). The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression (art. 39).
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article 40 of the Charter designed to prevent a potential threat to
world peace and security can be taken only if such measures do not
entail "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."",(Emphasis added.) Consequently, in reconciling these conflicting obligations-maintenance of world peace and
respect for Congolese domestic jurisdiction-the SecretaryGeneral did not base the intervention of troops in the Congo on
articles 39 and 40 but on articles41 and 42. 9 To justify his position
Hammarskjold said "[i]n the light of the domestic jurisdiction
limitation of the Charter, it must be assumed that the Council did
not authorize the Secretary-General to intervene with armed
troops in an internal conflict, when the Council has not specially
adopted enforcement measures under article 41 or 42 of Chapter
40
T'T "'

Further, to understand Hammarskjold's action and, therefore,
the legal grounds for the United Nations Force in the Congo, one
must also examine the texts of the following documents: (1) the
reports submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to the
Security Council;" (2) the communique between the Congolese
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
39. Both articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter are weak legal
instruments in the event of a situation potentially threatening to world peace and
security. Article 39 requires the Security Council to determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and to make
recommendations as to what should be done in the event thereof. Article 40
requires the Security Council to recommend to the parties concerned to comply
with the Security Council's decisions as per article 39.
Both articles 41 and 42 are, on the other hand, the only decisive legal instruments that the Security Council can effectively implement to stop an actual
threat to world peace and security. Article 41 calls upon the Security Council to
decide what measures to pursue-complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of sea, air, postal, telegraphic radio, and other means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 calls upon the Security Council to intervene with armed forces by air, sea or land as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
40. 15 U.N. SCOR, 887th meeting 10 (1960).
41. U.N. Doc. S/4417 (1960); U.N. Doc. S/4417/Add.1/Rev. 1 (1960); 15 U.N.
SCOR, 884th meeting (1960); 15 U.N. SCOR, 887th meeting (1960); U.N. Doc.
S/4482 1-4 (1960); U.N. Doc. S/4389 (1960); 13 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda
Item No. 65, at U.N. Doc. A/3943(1958). See also 8 U.N. Rev. 16 (May 1961); 9
U.N. Rev. 7 (Jan. 1962); 9 U.N. Rev. 5 (Feb. 1962); MiLLR, supra note 2, at 10;
N.Y. Post, March 30, 1962 (editorial).
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Government and the Secretary-General of the United Nations;42
(3) the views of Governments expressed in the proceedings of the
Security Council;43 (4) the resolutions passed by the Security
Council;4" (5) the views of the Governments expressed before the
General Assembly; 5 and (6) the General Assembly's resolutions.46
Of great significance were the resolutions passed by the Security
Council pursuant to an official plea from the Congo that had been
received on July 12, 1960.17 Two resolutions" were passed immediately. The operative clause of the first resolution (S/4387) on which
the United Nations Force was established stated that the Security
Council,
DECIDES to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary
steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide
the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary,
until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the
technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security
forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully
their tasks. 9
Therefore, E.M. Miller's argument that none of these "resolutions of the Security Council expressly provided for a United Nations Force (or authorized) the Secretary-General in explicit terms
42. U.N. Doc. S/4414 (1960); U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960); U.N. Doc. S/4940/Add.
14 (1961); U.N. Doc. Sf5038 (1961).
43. U.N. Doc. S/4414 (1960) (letter from Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba
to the Security Council dated July 31, 1960);U.N. Doc. S/4415 (1960) (comments
by the Representative of Ghana); U.N. Doc. S/4416 (1960) (comments by Representative of the Soviet Union); U.N. Doc. S/4417/Add.l/Rev.1 (1960) (comments
by Representative of Guinea); U.N. Doc. S/4516 (1960) (U.S. draft resolution).
44. U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960) (adopted at 873rd meeting, July 13, 1960); U.N.
Doc. S/4405 (1960) (adopted at 879th meeting, July 22, 1960); U.N. Doc. S/4426
(1960) (adopted at 886th meeting, Aug. 9, 1960); U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961)
(adopted at 942d meeting, Feb. 20-21, 1961).
45. U.N. Doc. S/4453 (1960); U.N. Doc.4503 (1960); U.N. Doc. S/4985fRev.2
(1960); U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1960).
46. U.N. Doc. A/Res. 1474 (ES-IV) (1960); G.A. Res. 1583, 15 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 16, at 52; G.A. Res. 1590, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 57; G.A. Res. 1595,
15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 13.
47. U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960).
48. U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960); U.N. Doc. S/4405 (1960).
49. U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
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to establish a force" 50 must be open to question. Further, if Miller
contends that the Secretary-General's implementation of the Security Council's resolutions and dispatch of the United Nations
Force into the Congo was a violation of article 2(7) of the United
Nations Charter on the grounds that nowhere in the said resolutions exist "explicit terms" authorizing the Secretary-General "to
establish a force,""1 then this argument must be inconsistent with
that portion of paragraph 2 of the Security Council's first resolution, which explicitly authorizes the provision of military assistance as may be necessary.
In implementing the Security Council resolutions, the
Secretary-General consulted and entered into agreement with
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba when he came to the United
Nations headquarters to address the United Nations in late July
1960.52 As a result of that meeting, the Secretary-General prepared
and submitted the following agreement to the Security Council:
1. The government of the Republic of the Congo states that, in the
exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the
Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations and by its
acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22
July 1960; it likewise states that it will ensure the freedom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the
requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with
the activities of the Force.
2. The United Nations takes note of this statement of the Government of the Republic of the Congo and states that, with regard to
the activities of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be
guided, in good faith, by the task assigned to the Force in the aforementioned resolutions; in particular the United Nations reaffirms,
considering it to be in accordance with the wishes of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, that it is prepared to maintain
the United Nations Force in the Congo until such time as it deems
the latter's task to have been fully accomplished.
3. The Government of the Republic of the Congo and the
Secretary-General state their intention to proceed immediately, in
50. MILLER, supra note 2, at 10.
51. Id.
52. U.N. Doc. S/4389/Add. 5 (1960).
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the light of paragraph 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly specific
aspects of the functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo,
notably with respect to its deployment, the question of its lines of
communication and supply, its lodging and its provisioning; the
Government of the Republic of the Congo, confirming its intention
to facilitate the functioning of the United Nations Force in the
Congo, and the United Nations have agreed to work together to
hasten the implementation of the guiding principles laid down in
consequence of the work of joint exploration on the basis of the
resolutions of the Security Council.
4. The foregoing provisions shall likewise be applicable, as appropriate, to the non-military aspects of the United Nations' operation
in the Congo.53
Further, in the second resolution,5 4 the Security Council maintained that "complete restoration of law and order in the Republic
of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security. 5 5 The most explicit expression
of the legality of continued presence of the United Nations Force
in the Congo is envisaged in the third resolution adopted by the
Security Council on August 9, 1960. In this resolution the Security
Council called upon "all Member-States, in accordance with articles 27 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council [with regard to the Congo and authorized]
the Secretary-General to implement this resolution and to report
further to the Security Council as appropriate."5 6
In view of the foregoing, the legality of United Nations actions
in the Congo is well supported. Furthermore, although the Republic of the Congo had not yet become a member of the United
Nations, the Republic's appeal to the United Nations under chapter VII, article 49 of the United Nations Charter constitutes supplementary evidence of the legality of the United Nations intervention in the Congo."
On the other hand, the legality of Hammarskjold's denial of
53. Id.
54. U.N. Doc. S/4405. See also U.N. Doc. S/4404 (draft resolution by Ceylon
& Tunisia); U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 878 (Security Council debate on Resolution), at 32,
37; U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 879 (meeting transcript adopting the Resolution), at 42-44.
55. U.N. Doc. S/4405 (1960).
56. U.N. Doc. S/4426 (1960).
57. U.N. Doc. S/4417/Add. 3 (1960).
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Prime Minister Lumumba's request for United Nations intervention in the Katanga Province to restore law and order in the Republic of the Congo as agreed upon in the second Security Council
resolution-No. S/4405, paragraphs 2 and 3-is questionable since
Hammarskjold's allegations that the United Nations Force's entry
in Katanga would be a violation of Katanga's right of domestic
jurisdiction were inconsistent with his pledge to maintain the
United Nations Force in the Congo until such time as it deemed
the task of restoration of peace completed."
None of the pertinent United Nations documents explicitly bar
the United Nations Force in the Congo from intervening in Katanga Province. Indeed, in its third resolution, No. S/4426, the
Security Council noted "with satisfaction the progress made by the
United Nations in carrying out the Security Council resolutions in
respect of the territory of the Republic of the Congo other than the
Province of Katanga."59 (Emphasis added.) As evidence of what
the United Nations had accomplished so far in the Congo and what
remained to be done, this implies that the Security Council expected intervention in Katanga. Thus, Hammarskjold's presumption that intervention in the seceding Katanga Province by the
United Nations Force would be a violation of article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter lacks substantial support.
It should also be added that, on the basis of the early experience
of the United Nations Emergency Force in Korea, Hammarskjold
constructed some "basic principles and rules" designed to provide
"an adaptable framework for the later operations"6 of the United
Nations Force in the Congo. These principles include: (1) The
United Nations cannot station units on the territory of a Member
State without the consent of the government concerned. (2) It is
for the United Nations alone to decide on the composition of any
force, taking fully into account the views of the host government.
(3) United Nations Forces should not include units from any of the
five permanent members of the Security Council or from any country that might be considered as having a special interest in the
situation. (4) United Nations Forces should have full freedom of
movement and all facilities necessary for their tasks. (5) The per58. U.N. Doc. S/4389/Add. 5 (1960).
59. U.N. Doc. S/4426 (1960).
60. S. BAILEY, THE UNITED NATIONS: A SHORT POLITICAL GUIDE 60 (1963).
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sonnel of the United Nations Force should be loyal to the aims of
the Organization and the Force should be directly responsible to
one of the main organs of the United Nations. (6) United Nations
personnel cannot be party to any internal conflict, and the United
Nations Force should not be used to enforce any special political
situation or to influence the political balance. (7) Since the United
Nations Force is an instrument for mediation and conciliation, it
cannot engage in combat activities, though it may respond with
force to an armed attack. (8) The cost should be allocated among
Member States according to the normal scale of budgetary contributions.6
To the contrary, however, Hammarskjold did not adhere to his
own "basic principles" when composing the United Nations Force
in the Congo. Executing only principles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8, he failed
to honor principles 3 and 7. For instance, although he excluded
units from the Permanent Members of theSecurity Council in conformity with the first clause in principle 3, he did not stick to his
position as envisaged in the last clause of the same principle. Thus,
in composing the United Nations Force the Secretary-General
drew most of the Force's units from African nations, 2 countries
with utmost interest in the Congo because of their Pan-Africanism.
Furthermore, the United Nations intervention in Katanga Province was neither a violation of principle 7 nor of article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, since it was this secession
that had triggered the national trouble in the Congo and had invited mercenaries from Belgium, South Africa, Rhodesia, etc., to
proceed against the national government. One critic of Hammarskjold's position writes that "the decision to maintain the unity of
the Congo in the face of separatist activities eventually required
U.N. officials to take action which had, or could be interpreted as
having, internal political implications. While the United Nations
exercised restraint in using force (principle 7), the Security Council did in the end authorize the use of force when necessary, as a
last resort ... ."' Thus, the Secretary-General's presumption

that the penetration of the United Nations Force in the Congo
(ONUC) into Katanga Province would constitute a violation of the
61.

Id.

62. Ghana, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Tunisia.
63.

BALEY, supra note 60, at 62.
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obligation of the United Nations to respect domestic jurisdiction
within the framework of article 2, paragraph 7 lacks legal foundation.
The Secretary-General insisted, however, that his interpretation
involved these four points: (1) The United Nations Force cannot
be used on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force
the Provincial Government to follow a specific line of action. (2)
United Nations facilities cannot be used to transport civilian or
military representatives of the Central Government to Katanga
against the desire of the Katanga Provincial Government. (3) The
United Nations Force has no duty, or right to protect civilian or
military personnel representing the Central Government beyond
what follows from its general duty to maintain law and order. (4)
The United Nations has no right to prevent the Central Government from taking any action which by its own means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, it can carry
through in relation to Katanga. 4 Hammarskjold also insisted that
these were the four elements that "would necessarily apply
mutatis mutandis, as regards to the Provincial
Government in its
'
65
relations with the Central Government.
If these four points did constitute the legal position of the United
Nations with respect to the Congo, then the Secretary-General was
correct, of course, that the United Nations Force had no business
intervening in the seceding Katanga Province, or interfering with
Katanga's form of action.
C. The Discrepancy Between the Respective Decisions of Hammarskjold and U Thant with Respect of Seceding Katanga
Province
If, however, one accepts Hammarskjold's four elements as the
definitive legal bases for United Nations action in the Congo, there
arise serious discrepancies between the United Nations position in
the Congo and the rationale for that position under the administrations of Hammarskjold and U Thant. If, as viewed by Hammarskjold, the United Nations lacked legal authority to intervene in
the situation between the Congolese Central Government and the
64. MmLER, supra note 2, at 16; U.N. Doc. S/4117/Add. 6, at 3-4 (1960).
65. MILLER, supra note 2, at 16; U.N. Doc. S/4417/Add. 6, at 3-4 (1960).
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seceding Katanga Province, then it should have been legally
inconsistent for the United Nations under U Thant to deviate from
Hammarskjold's position and resort to military force against Katanga's secession. Since the two Secretaries-General made opposite decisions with respect to Katanga's secession and since, in making such decisions both leaders were supposed to be governed by
the directives of the United Nations Charter and Security Council
Resolutions, one wonders what factors might have contributed to
their respective decision-making.
It is submitted that the socio-political environment (country of
citizenship, educational experiences, and professional experience)
of Hammarskjold and U Thant was a key factor in their respective
decision-making process with respect to Katanga. 66 (See Appendix.) Both Hammarskjold and U Thant were approximately the
same age. Before they were appointed Secretary-General to the
United Nations, both had read widely, held different responsible
administrative positions in their respective governments, and represented their countries at both regional conferences and the
United Nations. Regionally, Hammarskjold had served as: Sweden's chief delegate to the Paris Peace Conference on the Marshall
Plan (1947), Sweden's representative at the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), a member of the OEEC Executive Committee, and delegate to the new Council of Europe.
Because of Hammarskjold's intensive involvement in interEuropean cooperation, it is submitted that it is possible that Hammarskjold's Europhilia, which he acquired in the course of his
education and experience in Europe, must have been a factor in
his decision with respect to the Katanga question, especially since
Belgium was a key participant in the Katanga secession. Since a
severe action in the form of intercession by the United Nations
66. See generally P. BERGER & T. LUCKmN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE chs. IH& Ell (1970); D. EASTON
& J. DENNIS, CHILMDREN IN THE PoLrICAL SYSTEM, ORIGINS OF POLmCAL LEGITIMACY
(1969); S. GOLDMAN et al., THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1968); R. HESS & J.
TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN (1967); H. JACOB,
URBAN JUSTICE: LAW & ORDER IN AMERscAN CrrIEs (1973); H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN
AMERICA: COURTS, LAWYERS & JUDICIAL PROCESS (1965); R. LUCKHAM, THE NIGERIAN
MILITARY,

A

SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITY AND REVOLT

1960-1967 (1971);

J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN, SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL

DESEGREGATION

(1961).
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Force against Katanga's secession would have been inconsistent
with Hammarskjold's European-oriented attitude toward Katanga, he refused Lumumba's request for the United Nations Force
7
to proceed against Tshombe's Katanga to avoid dissonance.1
U. Thant, before becoming Secretary-General in 1961, had had
some regional apprenticeship with the African-Asian Conference
held in Bandung in 1955, which, like Hammarskjold's regional
apprenticeship, must have been a major factor in his decision.
Thus, unlike Hammarskjold's decision, U Thant's decision to take
action against Katanga's secession-a decision that was welcomed
by most African countries-must have been motivated, at least in
part, by his Third World sympathies as well as his views as to the
significance of chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It was
his positive attitude toward the Afro-Asian bloc, of which his own
country is a member, that determined the decision U Thant made.
Had U Thant been from the West, it is more likely that his decision
would not have deviated from that of Hammarskjold. This theory
of country-of-origin bias is also evidenced by: (1) the Western attitude in the 1966 International Court of Justice decision with respect to the South West African Case 6 -a decision that was absolutely political, and (2) the unconcerned attitude of the Western
powers in the United Nations with regard to (a) apartheid problems in Southern Africa, (b) the Smith regime in Zimbabwe, (c)
the Namibia Question, and (d) the annihilation of the African
population in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau by Portuguese colonists before the new Portuguese regime decided, in late
1974, to grant independence to these three territories.
67. For further details on this theory of goal-perception, situation-perception,
and decision-making with respect to that goal in order to avoid one's dissonance
(self-blame) see L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); Newcomb, An Approach to the Study of Communicative Arts, 60 PsYcHOLOGIcAL REV.
No. 6 (1953); Osgood & Tannenbaum, The Principlesof Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change, 62 PSYCHOLOGcAL REv. No. 1 (1955).

68. In the South West African Cases (1966), the International Court of Justice
dropped the case against both Ethiopia and Liberia (plaintiff) with the allegation

that the plaintiff did not have any legal right or interest in the subject matter of
their claims. South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 4. See also G. MANGONE,
THE ELEMENTS OF INTENATmONAL LAW

477, 501-25 (1967).
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CONCLUSION

With these experiences, it is therefore hoped that African states
will be more conscious of their status in the world today. Further,
it is hoped that African states will begin to reevaluate their Organization of African Unity (OAU) in terms of its strength and cohesiveness in common defense and cultural backgrounds. To be masters of themselves instead of relying on the United Nations or
foreign powers for help, it is imperative that the African states,
through OAU, strengthen themselves militarily to contain further
foreign aggression. This must be done because the United Nations
is composed of some Member States and persons with different
backgrounds and attitudes which militate against African sympathies. Although the General Assembly has a majority of Third
World nations, most of the key personnel are still from the West.
For instance, three of the four Secretaries-General have been from
the West.69
Although the use of force other than in self-defense or collective
defense is illegal, other states have repeatedly used it to achieve
their perceived ends; for instance the United States in Korea
(1950-51) (the United Nations entered Korea after the United
States was already in the area), Vietnam (1954-73), the Bay of Pigs
(1961), and in the Cuba Missile Crisis (1962); the Soviet Union in
Czechoslovakia (1968), and in Hungary (1956); and the United
Kingdom, France, and Israel in the Suez Canal (1956). Neither this
past experience nor the concept of self-defense as "inherent in
every sovereign state and . . . [explicit or] implicit in every
treaty,"7 0 should be ignored by African states, which should reconsider their international status. Regardless of the Charter provision
of article 2, paragraph 4, which prohibits every Member State of
the United Nations from resorting to force as a means of settling
disputes, under this same Charter, article 51, African states are
also free at all times to defend their territories from foreign attack
or invasion. Indeed they alone are rationally and legally competent
to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self69. Trygve Halvdan, 1946-53 (Norwegian); Dag Hammarskjold, 1953-61
(Swedish); U Thant, 1961-71 (Burmese); and Kurt Waldheim, 1971 to the present

(Austrian).
70. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

318 (1967).
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defense. 7 ' According to the prevailing customary right of selfdefense under the framework of International Law, the resort to
physical means of self-defense is legitimate not only to protect the
state's territorial integrity against direct aggression, but is equally
legitimate when resorted to solely for the protection of those interests that collectively comprise the nation's security and, therefore,
its total political independence.72 Furthermore, like all other de
jure states elsewhere, the African states are the only ones that are
rationally and legally competent to determine when they should
resort or not resort to war because world history explicitly shows
that we still live in an amorphous and acephalous world whose law
and order, therefore, relies significantly on the 'conduct' of a constellation of sovereign political entities called nation-states. According to history, up to now, we still live in a world of anarchy-a
world without any central governing body or agency above individual state(s) with a higher authority and power to make binding
laws upon nation-states and the latter's conduct.3 Of course,
states are not only homo politicus but also homo juridicus; hence,
they are competent to make commitments and treaties within the
framework of pacta sunt servanda as also envisaged in the United
Nations Charter. However, the African nation-states must also
realize that unlike individuals who must comply with the dictates
of their respective sovereign states or else be punished by their
respective municipal laws for such misconduct, states do not have
to comply with anyone including their own commitments and
treaties so long as there exists no higher authority above the sovereignty of the state, which can punish any state for non-compliance.
In a sense, International Law sui generis is still in its infancy-it
is still too primitive and, therefore, a very unreliable instrument
or weapon for world order and security. Thus, given this reality,
African states individually and collectively in the OAU must not
ignore the alternative of self-help when United Nations decisions-based on Western attitudes and concepts-are antithetical
to the best interests of Africa.
71. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 776 (1962).
72. See also J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 414-32 (1963); H. KELSEN,
CIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

73 (1966); H.

INTERNATIONAL LAW BY INTERNATIONAL CouRT 317-18
NATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 297-304 (8th ed. 1967).

73. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
Jervis eds. 1973).
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APPENDIX*

A

COMPARISON OF THE BIOGRAPHIES OF
DAG HAMMARSKJOLD AND U THANT
U Thant

Dag Hammarskjold
Birth Date:

July 29, 1905

January 22, 1909

Birth Place:

Sweden

Burma

Citizenship:

Swedish

Burmese

State's Regional Organization:

European Free Trade Association

African-Asian
Alignment

Education:

Major:
Literature,
Philosophy,
French Law, Economics

Professional Experience:

Secretary of the Royal Commission
on Unemployment (1934)

Major: English, History, Mathematics, Civics
Headmaster of Pantanaw School
(1931)

Undersecretary in
Finance (1936-45)

Ministry

of

Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Bank of Sweden (194145)
Sweden's chief delegate to Paris
Conference on the Marshall Plan
aid (1947)
Sweden's Representative to Organization for European Economic
Cooperation
Member of OEEC Executive Committee
Delegate to the New Council of
Europe

Swedish Delegation
United Nations (1952)

Swedish
Member

Secretary-General of United
Nations (1953)

Non-

Educator and Writer (193147)
Published a translated work on the
League of Nations (1933)
Published
recommendations
on
Educational Reforms in Burma
(1946)
Press Director of Burma (1947)
Broadcasting Director of Burma
(1948)
Secretary in Burmese Ministry of
Information (1959)
Secretary
in
Burmese
Minister's Office (1953)

Forof

Special Advisor to Burmese Prime
Minister

For-

Secretary-General of Swedish
Foreign Office (1949)
Vice-Minister for
eign Affairs (1952)

of

Secretary in Prime Minister's
Office and Executive Secretary of
Burmese Economic and Social
Board (1955)
Member of Burmese Delegation
of Goodwill Mission to Thailand
and Indonesia (1951)
Member of Burmese Delegation
to the United Nations (1952)

Economic and Financial Special
Advisor to the Swedish Cabinet
(1945-47)
Undersecretary in Swedish
eign Office (1945-47)

Group

a)Colombo
Prime
Conference (1950)

Ministers'

b)African-Asian Conference,
Bandung, Indonesia (1955)
c)Third Colombo Prime
Ministers' Conference (1956)
d)Asian
Socialist
Conference
at Bombay (1956)

*Source: A. Rovmre, THE FmsT Fr= YEARS; TsM SECanTARY-GENERAL
WoRLD PoLmcs 1920-1970 271-78, 341-46 (1970).
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Burmese Ambassador
Nations (1957)
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to United

Chairman of Burmese Delegation to
the United Nations General Assembly
(1957-61)
Vice President of United Nations
General Assembly (1959)
Acting Secretary-General of United
Nations (1961)
Secretary-General of United Nations
(1961)

